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TAx EVASION, WILLFULLNESS AND THE SUBJECTIVE STANDARD:
THE LAW INVITES A CHARLATAN
Cheek v. United States,
111 S. Ct. 604 (1991)
Walter C. Morrison IV
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court was faced with a taxing decision in Cheek v.
United States.1 The Court considered the application of two diverse standards to be
applied in a tax evasion case where the defendant proclaimed a mistake of law de-
fense.2 The Court was forced to decide whether the claimed mistake need be sub-
jectively or objectively reasonable.' "It has been said that '[t]he law always lags
behind the most advanced thinking in every area.' "' Cheek was the opportunity
for the law to gain some ground.
II. FACTS
John L. Cheek was an airline pilot for American Airlines. 5 He filed federal in-
come tax returns through 1979, but with the exception of a frivolous return filed in
1982,6 he failed to file any subsequent returns.' Cheek gradually increased his
number of withholding allowances, claiming sixty by 1980. Also, for the years
1981 to 1984, he claimed exemption from federal income taxes.8
This behavior resulted in Cheek's indictment for ten federal law violations, in-
cluding six counts of willful failure to file federal income tax returns in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 7203. 9 He was also indicted on three counts of willful attempt to
evade income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201.10
1. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
2. Id. at 606-10. See also infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
3. Cheek, I I1 S. Ct. at 606.
4. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977) (citations omitted).
5. Cheek, I 1 S. Ct. at 606.
6. Id. n.l.
7. 111 S. Ct. at 606.
8. Id.
9. Id. Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code states:
Any person required under this title to pay any. . . tax, or required by this title or by regulations made
under authority thereof to make a return. . . who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or ...make
such return. . . shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and...
shall be fined not more than $25,000. . .or imprisoned not more than 1 year ....
26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1990).
10. Cheek, I11 S. Ct. at 606-07. Section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code states: "[any person who will-
fully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax. . . shall ... be guilty of a felony and. . . shall be fined
not more than $100,000. . .or imprisoned not more than 5 years ..
26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988).
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Representing himself at trial, Cheek admitted he had filed no personal income
tax returns for the stated years." Cheek also testified that he had attended meet-
ings sponsored by a group believing that the federal tax system was unconstitu-
tional. 2 At some of these meetings, lawyers would speak, giving their
professional opinion that the federal income tax laws were invalid. 13 Furthermore,
Cheek introduced an attorney's letter stating that the Sixteenth Amendment autho-
rized a tax only on gain or profit, not on wages and salaries. 4
Cheek defended his actions by saying that based on the information given to
him at these meetings and from his private studies," he believed that his behavior
during the years 1980 through 1986 was lawful and that the tax laws as enforced
were unconstitutional.1" The trial judge, in response to questions from the jury in-
dicating confusion as to the court's instructions on the willfulness element, in-
structed the jury that " 'an honest but unreasonable belief. . . does not negate
willfulness,"' and that" 'the conclusion that wages. . are not income. . . is not
objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the basis for a good faith misunder-
11. Cheek, 11I S. Ct. at 607. Cheek was charged with failing to file his income tax returns for 1980, 1981,
and 1983-1986. Id. at 606. The tax evasion charges concerned the years of 1980, 1981 and 1983. Id. at 607.
12. Id. at 607.
13. Id. Cheek argued that his reliance on experts, some of whom included attorneys, should serve as a defense
or, at least minimally, evidence that he was, in fact, ignorant of the law. Id. But see Livingston Hall and Selig J.
Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1940) [hereinafter Hall & Seligman].
It would be unwise social policy to reward the clients of lawyers who gave favorable but unreasonable
advice, at the expense of others in the community who were given unfavorable but correct opinions on the
law. Lawyers are under enough temptations toward dishonesty already, without giving them the power to
grant indulgences, for a fee, in criminal cases. Nor is the private attorney an 'officer of the state' for whose
advice the state is responsible, whatever may be his status as an 'officer of the court' for other purposes.
Id. at 652.
14. Id.
15. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 607. The Supreme Court failed to elaborate on the type of study in which Cheek
participated; however, Cheek was not new to the court system. Id. n.3. In March, 1982, Cheek sued American
Airlines to challenge its federal income tax withholding. Id. In April, Cheek filed suit in the United States Tax
Court, claiming that under the Internal Revenue Code he would not be defined as a taxpayer and, as such, his
wages did not constitute income. Id. Cheek also filed an action in federal district court, asserting that wage with-
holdings were violations of the Sixteenth Amendment. Id. In 1985, Cheek sought to have the taxes withheld in
1983 and 1984 refunded to him. Id. When this money was not refunded, Cheek filed in district court asserting
that because his wages did not constitute income, any withholding would be an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty. Id. The district court dismissed the action as frivolous, imposing costs, attorneys fees and Rule 11 sanctions
against Cheek. Id. The court of appeals agreed and imposed additional sanctions because of his frivolous appeal.
Id.
16. Cheek, 11I S. Ct. at 607.
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standing of the law of defense.' "17 Soon after, the jury finished its deliberations
and found Cheek guilty on all counts.18 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed Cheek's convictions.19 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.2 The
Court held that a good faith misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that
one is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief
or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.21
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A. The Sixteenth Amendment and the History of Taxation
The Constitution vests Congress with the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense
and general Welfare of the United States ... and to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . "..."22
According to Professor Bittker, "[1]ike all other federal powers, the right of Con-
gress to levy and collect taxes is subject to a wide range of constitutional limits,
including the due process clause, the right to trial by jury and the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures."23 The taxing power is further restricted by
the "direct tax" clause.24
The direct tax clause requires that "[n]o Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall
be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed
to be taken."25 This apportionment requirement is reiterated in Article I, Section 2
17. Id. at 608 (citation omitted). A note signed by all 12 jurors also informed the judge that although the jury
found Cheek guilty, several jurors wanted to express their personal opinions of the case. Several notes from the
jurors to Judge Plunkett were a complaint against the narrow and hard requirements under the law.
One note read:
We are herein returning our verdict of guilty as charged on all counts. Some of our jurors wished to ex-
press their personal opinions. These opinions are not meant to affect in any way their verdict of guilty.
These opinions are forwarded as a complaint against the narrow and hard expressions under the con-
straints of the law. We would request that if possible this statement be read in court.
Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari at 27, Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
This document was attached to another note written by a single juror. It stated:
I feel Mr. Cheek is a reasonable person and sincerely believes in his cause. I felt I had to write to express
what I sincerely feel. I know the gentleman is guilty of a crime. However, I honestly believe he believes so
deeply in his cause that he has risked everything for this cause and truly does not believe he is breaking
the law.
Petitioner's Writ of Certiori at 27, Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
18. Cheek, I lIS. Ct. at 608.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 609, 613. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to the conflict between the Seventh Circuit and
the remaining circuits. Id. at 609.
21. Id. at 613. In an issue not addressed by this note, the court also held that it was proper for the Tax Court to
instruct the jury not to consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws are unconstitutional since a defendant's views
about the tax laws' validity are irrelevant in determining the issue of willfulness and should not be considered by a
jury, because such mistakes do not arise from the complexity of the tax code. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18.
23. Bois I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1.2.1 (2d
ed. 1989) [hereinafter BITTKER & LOKKEN].
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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of the United States Constitution: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be ap-
portioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, ac-
cording to their respective Numbers,.. "26 It was this clause that the Supreme
Court used to hold an early tax law, the 1894 income tax, unconstitutional in Pol-
lock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 27 Thus, in order to collect taxes, Congress would
have needed to take census figures and apportion the taxes appropriately. 28
The direct tax clause was the focus of numerous other Supreme Court cases,29
each of which seemed to further cloud the issue and, in addition, hold another tax
law unconstitutional." This line of cases forced Congress to propose the passage
of the Sixteenth Amendment.31
In February of 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment was certified by the Secretary
of State as being ratified by the states.32 It provided that "[t]he Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enu-
meration."33
Soon after the Sixteenth Amendment's ratification, Congress enacted the Reve-
nue Act of 1913, which required individuals and corporations to pay income tax.?4
In spite of numerous attempts to hold this and other tax laws unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court refused to undermine Congress' revenue-raising machine. a
Hence, the tax system was born and Americans have been paying for it ever
since -some more agreeably than others.
B. Tax Noncompliance
Shortly before the April fifteenth tax return date in 1983, Time magazine de-
voted its cover story to the question of how poorly the American people comply
with the nation's tax laws. 3' The cover featured a taxpayer, drowning with a huge
bundle of cash hidden behind his back.37 The headline was menacing: "Tax Cheat-
ing- Bad and Getting Worse".38
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 3.
27. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), overruled, 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
28. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 23, at 1.2.2.
29. These cases include: W. E. Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918); Springer v. United States, 102
U.S. 586 (1880); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
30. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 23, at 1.2.2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1.2.3.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
34. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 23, at 1.2.3.
35. Id.
36. SUSAN B. LONG & DAVID BURNHAM, THE NUMBERS GAME: CHANGES IN TAX COMPLIANCE DURING THE
LAST 25 YEARS? at 7 [hereinafter LONG & BURNHAM]. See also Otto Friedrich, Cheating by the Millions, TIME,
March 28, 1983, at 26-33.
37. LONG & BURNHAM, supra note 36, at 7.
38. Friedrich, supra note 36, at 26.
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Time quoted Roscoe Egger, Jr., then the IRS Commissioner, in the article.3 9
Egger linked what Time proclaimed to be an "epidemic" of tax evasion to the wave
of civil disobedience that had swept the United States during the Vietnam War and
the civil rights era of the 1960's.4" "The concept of civil disobedience, of demon-
strations against authority, has people acting in a way that would not have been
considered patriotic or acceptable in the past."41
In 1985, Michael Dukakis joined the Internal Revenue Commissioner when he
denounced the "scandalous gap between our tax laws and the compliance with
those laws." '42 Mr. Dukakis stated:
Tax compliance is declining at an alarming rate. Twenty years ago, according to the
IRS, the tax compliance rate was approximately 94%. Last year [1984] our tax
compliance rate in the United States had dropped to nearly 81 %, which means that
43as of this moment, one out of five Americans is not paying the taxes he owes.
In May of 1987, an informal Congressional task force published a report claiming
that the tax gap between income taxes paid and income taxes owed exceeded $100
billion for 1986 and was rapidly growing."
1. The General Public
Because the American tax system is voluntary in nature, this year 113 million
Americans will complete a great act of voluntary compliance.45 But, while the
overwhelming majority will religiously pay every cent of taxes they owe, a small
group of people will not.' The IRS estimates that the compliance rate in America
is eighty-three percent; this represents a gross underpayment of $100 billion for
1991 and $113 billion for 1992. 4' According to the IRS, if these sums were paid,
the $318.1 billion federal budget deficit could be wiped out by 1993.'
Individual citizens are the worst offenders. 49 The IRS states that they comprise
seventy-five percent of each year's tax shortfall, while corporations account for
only twenty-five percent.50 Furthermore, the statistical evidence indicates that in-
dividuals are cheating now more than ever."
The people who cheat are those with the greatest opportunity to cheat, those in






44. Id. at 80.
45. Marguerite T. Smith, Who Cheats on Their Income Taxes, MONEY, Apr. 1991, at 101-08.
46. ld. at 101.




51. Smith, supra note 45, at 102.
52. Id.
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service businesses account for seventy-two percent of the Gross National Product
today, but only sixty-eight percent in 1982.5 For example, the country's 2.3 mil-
lion waiters and waitresses grossly underreport eighty-four percent of their tips. 4
Surprisingly, much underreporting occurs among the poor and elderly who do so
largely to maintain their standard of living. 5
2. Illegal Tax Protesters -A Special Breed
The illegal tax protester movement, unlike legitimate movements to bring about
changes in the tax laws, has assumed a posture of arbitrary disobedience. 6 Pro-
testers are often vocal and seek publicity. 5 Their techniques include fraud, harass-
ment, and occasional violence.5 8 A group of employees in Michigan, who filed
over 3,500 false Forms W-4, and a group of Wyoming residents, who were ar-
rested and charged with threatening special agents, are two examples of the tax
protester."9 They often participate in cult-like groups and attach tax protester liter-
ature to their returns; their most common attribute, however, is that they do not
pay their taxes and are content with using any possible defense to prevent paying
their taxes or going to prison."
C. Case Law Development
The key element needed to convict a defendant for "specific intent" crimes such
as tax evasion and failure to file tax returns is that of "willfulness".61 In United
States v. Bishop,62 the Supreme Court introduced the formulation of willfulness as
"a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."6
Since Bishop and United States v. Pompanio,64 which dealt with willfulness in a
tax evasion case, the majority of circuits have adopted a "subjectively reasonable"
test that would negate the willfulness requirement necessary for conviction in a tax
evasion case.6 The subjective test requires that the defendant honestly believe that
what he is doing is not unlawful, but totally legal.66 Regardless of how extraordi-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Smith, supra note 45, at 102.




60. "The tax criminal is the common criminal who pays no tax on ill gotten gains, the tax adept who knows
what cheating is and how to do it, and the tax protestor who clutters the courts with asininity, risking incarcera-
tion while spreading, unfortunately, the gospel of the inane." Mark D. Yochum, Ignorance of the Lawls No Excuse
Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DuQ. L. REv. 221 (1989).
61. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201,7203 (1988).
62. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
63. Id. at 360.
64. 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
65. See infra notes 71-133 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
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nary the mistake might be, the only requirement is that the defendant honestly be-
lieve that what he is doing is legal.67
While the majority of circuits apply the subjectively reasonable test, the Sev-
enth Circuit has adopted an "objectively reasonable" test. 8 The objective test re-
quires that in addition to the defendant's honest belief that what he is doing is legal,
such belief must also be objectively reasonable.6" Thus, courts will be allowed to
prevent the mistake of law defense from being asserted when the alleged mistake is
unusually outrageous." The following sections of this paper will trace the history
and development of tax evasion case law in the Seventh Circuit and include a sam-
ple of cases decided during the same time period by other circuits.
1. Subjective Test
In United States v. Aitken,7 1 the First Circuit considered whether "willfulness"
should be determined subjectively, whether the defendant intended to disobey the
law, or objectively, whether the defendant had reasonable grounds for failing to
comply with the law.72
The defendant was charged with failing to file his tax returns for the years 1979,
1980 and 1981, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203."3 He was employed as a fireman
and testified that "he did not believe that his wages constituted income because
they involved an exchange of time for money, with no gain for him."74 To show
willfulness, the government stated that the defendant had filed returns for the
years 1965 through 1977, but that for four later consecutive years he had not filed
any returns, despite his receipt of W-2 statements from his employer.7"
The defendant argued that "if he 'innocently in good faith sincerely believed his
actions,' then he had a valid defense to the charges against him."76 However, the
government contended that" 'in order to raise a mistake of law defense, the de-
fendant must also show that he acted reasonably.' 77
67. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 134-224 and accompanying text.
69. Id.
70. For example, some courts have taken a meager stand in reducing the force of the mistake of law defense by
limiting the use of extrinsic evidence to establish how the taxpayer came to his erroneous conclusion. In United
States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986), a tax protestor who had formed the notion from his own re-
search that wages were not income, sought to present evidence of that research to the court. The court excluded
the evidence because the reasonableness of the defendant's belief had little relevance; what was relevant was
whether the tax protester actually held that belief. Id. at 1285. See also United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439 (5th
Cir. 1984).
71. 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985).





77. 755 F.2d at 190 (quoting Unites States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S.916 (1981)).
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At the close of trial, Aitken requested several instructions on the willfulness re-
quirement.78 These instructions suggested the application of the subjective test.79
The government's requested jury instructions clearly suggested that the correct
standard to apply was the objective standard.8" The trial court proceeded to in-
struct the jury that "[t]here has to be a mistake concerning the requirements of the
law, a mistake that is objectively reasonable in order to say that particular conduct
is not willful conduct."81 On this instruction, the jury convicted the defendant.82
The court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction stating that "the court's
'objectively reasonable' instructions were erroneous."83 This decision to apply the
subjective standard was based on a survey of decisions from other circuits.84 The
court held that "this survey leads us to conclude that the overwhelming weight of
authority in the field of criminal prosecutions for failure to file tax returns and for
tax evasion insists on a subjective standard for assessing willfulness."85 Finally,
the court stated that while the "mistake of law" defense is an "extremely limited"
defense, it would be inappropriate to so limit it in cases involving a willful failure
to report.
86
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit applied the subjective test in United States v. Burton.87
The trial court convicted the defendant of two counts of failing to file tax returns
and filing false W-4 forms.88 Burton argued that "the District Court effectively
withheld the essential element of willfulness from thejury by instructing them that
his alleged good faith belief that wages were not taxable income was not a de-
fense."89
According to the evidence established at trial, Burton filed his tax returns, stat-
ing on his withholding forms that he should be exempt from paying his taxes. 90 He
also produced evidence that "at relevant times he did not know that the law defined
wages as income and consequently did not have the requisite intent to violate the
78. 755 F.2d at 190. The defendant's requested instruction was as follows: "[the defendant's conduct is not
willful and he is not guilty if you find that he failed to file a return because of mistake, inadvertence, gross negli-
gence or due to an honest, sincere and good faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the law." Id.
79. Id. at 190.
80. Aitken, 755 F.2d at 190. The government's requested jury instruction was as follows:
[I]f a person acts without reasonable care or reasonable grounds in the belief that his conduct was law-
ful, it is for you to decide whether he acted in good faith, or whether he willfully intended to fail to file an
income tax return.
If a defendant does not have a reasonable ground for his belief, then regardless of the defendant's "sin-
cerity of belief," he does not have a good faith misunderstanding of the requirements of the law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 190-91.
83. Id. at 193.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 192-93.
87. 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984).
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law." Over the objections of Burton's counsel, the district court instructed the
jury "that a good faith belief that wages are not income is not a defense in this
case.
92
Burton appealed his conviction and argued that this instruction undercut his
mistake of law defense.93 The court held that "[a] bona fide misunderstanding of
the tax laws can negate the essential element of willfulness and in this sense is a
'defense.' "I' The court further stated that "the district court's instructions took
Burton's alleged bona fide misunderstanding of the taxability of wages out of the
definition of willfulness."95 The government argued that "such a claim of subjec-
tive innocence must be 'objectively reasonable.' "9' The court stated that because
"a limit of objective reasonableness improperly diminishes the jury's role, we re-
ject the argument. "9'
The court cited various authorities in which the jury was allowed "to decide
whether the taxpayer held a good faith belief that wages were not taxable in-
come."98 The court stated that "it was plain error for the trial court to invite the
jury to consider what other people similarly situated would have reasonably real-
ized. , 9'
Thus, the court again applied the subjective test and reversed the trial court's
conviction of Mr. Burton.' 00 The court specifically rejected the government's at-
tempt to apply a two-part test in these tax evasion cases. 0' Under the government's
proposed test, the judge should first be allowed to decide whether "defendant's
claim is sufficiently credible to be considered by the jury."'12 Secondly, and only
after passing the judge's scrutiny, the jury would be allowed to decide on the valid-
ity of the alleged good faith defense.103 The appeals court held that "as far-fetched
as it may be, Burton's claim that he did not know that the tax laws included wages
in taxable income was for the jury [to decide] because the government is never en-









98. Id. The Court cited United States v. Herzog, 632 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ware, 608
F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Pinner, 561 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir, 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115
(1979) (remanded to trial court because trial judge made no comment about defendant's credibility).
99. Burton, 737 F.2d at 441 (citing Man v. United States, 319 E2d 404,409 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 986 (1964)).




104. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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In United States v. Jerde, °5 the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction of the de-
fendant who had failed to file his tax returns.'06 Larry Jerde appealed his convic-
tion for failing to file both employer's tax returns and personal income tax returns
for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984.107 Jerde argued that the trial court erred in its
jury instructions regarding willfulness and good faith.108
Jerde was a certified public accountant who had practiced for approximately
eleven years. 09 In 1982, he entered into an association with Jeske, a former IRS
agent. 1 0 The practice was incorporated, with each owner purchasing half of the
corporation's stock.11 However, in 1983 the business relationship deteriorated
and Jeske left the firm.
1 2
A lawsuit was filed by Jeske to recover the $11,000 initial investment he had
made in the business. 113 While the litigation was pending, Jerde failed to file his
personal tax returns for 1982 through 1984.114 Jerde's defense was that his failure
to file was not willful since he acted with a good faith belief that the ongoing litiga-
tion prevented him from completing the returns accurately."'
Jerde argued that the jury instructions given by the district court were errone-
ous and may have led the jury to judge his good faith defense under the objective
test rather than the subjective test. 116 The court stated that:
In the context of the trial and of the jury charge as a whole, however, we conclude
that the use of the words "good faith reason" did not transmute from a subjective to
an objective test the standard to be applied by the jury to Jerde's claimed good-faith
belief that he could not timely file the returns in question." 7
The court held that "a subjective rather than an objective standard is to be applied
in evaluating a good-faith defense to the charge of willfully failing to file tax re-
turns ... "118 The court affirmed the lower court's conviction of Mr. Jerde but
105. 841 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1988).
106. Id. at 820.
107. Id. at 819.
108. Id. at 820. The relevant jury instruction read as follows:
Wilfulness [sic] is an essential element of the crime of failure to file an income tax return. The word "will-
fully["] used in connection with this offense means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
duty, or otherwise stated, with the wrongful purpose of deliberately intending not to file a return which
defendant knew he should have fided in order to prevent the government from knowing the extent of and
knowing the facts material to the determination of his tax liability. You are instructed that the government
is not required to prove bad purpose or evil motive.
Id. at 821.







116. Id. at 820-21. See supra note 108.
117. Id. at 822-23 (footnote omitted).
118. Id. at 822. (citing United States v. Wells, 790 F.2d 73, 75 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Aitken, 755
F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1985)).
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reiterated that the subjective test and not the objective test is the proper standard to
be applied.119
In United States v. Phillips,12 the Tenth Circuit also applied the subjective
standard and stated that "[w]hile the Tenth Circuit has never explicitly held that an
objective standard is impermissible in failure to file cases, we have implied that
the appropriate standard is a subjective one." '121
Here, the defendant was convicted by a jury of willfully and knowingly failing
to file income tax returns for three years. 122 In his defense, the defendant argued
that he had not filed because he had sincerely and honestly believed that wages
were not income. 
123
Again, the focus of the defendant's appeal was on a jury instruction.124 The trial
court instructed the jury that:
A mistake of law must be objectively reasonable to be a defense. If you find that the
defendant did not have a reasonable ground for his belief, then regardless of the de-
fendant's sincerity of belief, you may find that he did not have a good faith misunder-
standing of the requirements of the law.
12 5
The defendant argued that "this instruction was erroneous in that subjective belief
that filing is not required, regardless of whether reasonably based, negates willful-
ness."12 The government argued that using the objective standard was appropri-
ate. 
127
The appeals court looked to the First Circuit's decision in Aitken 121 for guid-
ance. The government, however, relied on Moore.129 The court concluded that
"the balance of the circuits that have considered the issue have. . . implicitly indi-
cated . .. that only subjective intent to disobey the filing requirement need be
proved . ",130 The court stated that:
In view of Congress' express requirement that willful failure to file need be shown in
these cases, we decline to impose criminal liability on individuals who in good faith
misunderstand the law .... We find that a subjective standard is appropriately ap-
plied in assessing a defendant's claimed belief that the law did not require that he file
a return. 
131
119. Id. at 822.
120. 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 264.






128. See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the Aitken decision.
129. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). See infra notes 134-58 and accompany-
ing text.
130. Phillips, 775 F.2d at 264 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
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Because the trial court had applied an objective standard, the defendant was
granted a new trial.132
2. Objective Test
In United States v. Moore,133 the Seventh Circuit, for the first time, applied the
"objectively reasonable" test in a tax evasion case.134 The defendant David Moore
was charged with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7203 by failure to file tax returns from
1972 to 1974.135 He had filed tax returns for at least five of the years prior to
1972.136 Mr. Moore was a businessman with an income during each of these years
which exceeded $30,000.137
For 1972, the defendant submitted a tax return that contained only his name,
occupation, social security number and number of his dependents. 138 He also
wrote Fifth Amendment objections across the forms and attached tax protest liter-
ature.139 The IRS replied to Moore's return by stating that the forms were insuffi-
cient returns. 140 The defendant replied that he thought dollars were worthless and
his tax return was adequate. 
141
In May of 1974, the defendant amended his 1040 form for 1972.142 This return
included the word "none" in various blanks that called for numerical informa-
tion." However, Moore did include forty-one dollars for interest income and
twenty-two dollars for dividend income.' " This amended return again included
the Fifth Amendment objections and additional tax protest literature. 145 Both the
amended and original forms were signed; the certification, however, was marked
over on each form. 146 For 1973 and 1974, the defendant filed returns that were
nearly identical to his amended 1972 form. 147 Each time the IRS notified the de-
fendant that the returns were not sufficient."'
The district court concluded that "the true nature of defendant's defense was
that he had made a mistake of law, because he believed that he had filed an ade-
132. Id.
133. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). See also supra note 129.
134. Id. at 833.
135. Id. at 831.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 831-32.
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quate 'return' ". 149 The appeals court stated that "[t]he mistake of law defense is
extremely limited and the mistake must be objectively reasonable.""'
Moore's defense was based on his belief that the income tax system was uncon-
stitutional and that federal reserve notes were worthless. 1 ' In rejecting his claim,
the court stated that "if defendant had studied United States v. Daly"52 and United
States v. Porth"3 as carefully as he claims, he would have noticed that the courts
have consistently rejected these views as totally frivolous." 54 The court concluded
that "[i]t would appear impossible for a taxpayer to reasonably believe that Federal
Reserve Notes are worthless and therefore that income received in that form does
not have to be reported.""5
The court showed a hint of what was to come by stating in dicta that:
In the tax protester cases, it is obvious that there is no "honest and genuine" attempt
to meet the requirements of the code. In our self-reporting tax system, the govern-
ment should not be forced to accept as a return a document which plainly is not in-
tended to give the required information. 
156
Next in the line of tax protester cases was United States v. Witvoet. 5 7 The de-
fendant, Eugene Witvoet, was charged with willful failure to file federal income
tax returns for 1980 and 1981 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203.158
In 1978, Witvoet became acquainted with tax protest movement members.
15 9
The tax protesters claimed to be experts and claimed that payment of income taxes
was totally voluntary. 160 One such "expert" even argued that the payment of taxes
was illegal. 161 Based on the views of these protesters and without any independent
investigation of people outside of the tax protest movement, Witvoet decided not
to pay his taxes. 162 He gave many reasons for his failure to pay taxes, including that
he did not enjoy paying his taxes and that he thought perhaps paying his taxes was
illegal.163 Only after Witvoet learned that one of the so-called "experts" had been
imprisoned did he pay his income taxes." At trial he testified that he did this to
149. Id. at 833.
150. Id. (citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
153. 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
154. Moore, 627 F.2d at 833.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 767 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 338.
160. Id. at 338-39.




MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
make a good impression on his jury at the trial."16 The jury eventually convicted
Witvoet of willful failure to file for 1981.166
Witvoet's appeal was based on the contention that the trial judge gave an im-
proper jury instruction." 7 The court had instructed the jury that "[a] good faith
misunderstanding of the law which the defendant is charged with violating is a de-
fense if based on objectively reasonable grounds."'68
Witvoet claimed that it was error to instruct the jury that the good faith misun-
derstanding of the law defense must be objectively reasonable. 69 Although the
court did not have to review the jury instruction because of a procedural error,170
the court went on to say that "[n]either this court nor the Supreme Court has over-
ruled Moore, and it stands as. . . the law in the Seventh Circuit."'71
In August of 1985, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Bressler.172
Bressler was a tax protester who objected to the payment of income tax. 173 The de-
fendant's total gross income for 1977 was $102,871.86 and for 1978 was
$150,578.07.174 Bressler's taxable income was computed as $42,071.56; how-
ever, because Bressler had not filed any returns, the government indicted him on
two counts of willfully failing to file tax returns for the years of 1977 and 1978.171
At trial, the government called several witnesses, one of whom stated that "the
defendant admitted he had not filed a tax return for thirteen years, that paying in-
come taxes was voluntary, and that the American people were 'dumb, dumb,
dumb' for filing tax returns." 176 The defendant also said a person had a slim chance
of being caught for failing to file returns and advocated methods for evading in-
come taxes. 177 Bressler argued that the trial judge erred by instructing thejury that
"a good faith misunderstanding of the law may negate willfulness if the misunder-
standing is reasonable."1 78 Bressler contended that such a defense need not be ob-




168. Id. (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 340.
170. Id. The court did not review the jury instruction because it was not considered "plain error" within the
meaning of Rule 52(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
171. Id. (footnote omitted).
172. 772 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).





178. Id. at 290.
179. Id.
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decisions in other circuits18 and held that the "objectively reasonable" test, as
mentioned in Witvoet, was still the law in the Seventh Circuit.' 81
Next, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Foster.'82 In Foster, the de-
fendant was charged with violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, and 7205.183
James Foster failed to file tax returns for the years 1979 through 1982, although he
was employed and collecting pension benefits from a previous employer.' 84
The grand jury indicted Foster for failing to file tax returns for the years of
1979, 1980 and 1982 and for willful tax evasion for the years of 1981 through
1982.185 In a bench trial, he was convicted on all counts. 86
Foster claimed the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to establish the
mental state required for any conviction.' 87 The court stated that "[t]o show that
Foster acted willfully, the government needed to demonstrate that Foster inten-
tionally violated a known legal duty."' 88 The district court found that Foster knew
that he was obligated to file tax returns, that he knew his statements on his W-2
forms were false, and that his "overall purpose" was to evade the taxes he owed. 88
The court stated that Foster had filed accurate tax returns before 1979 and that
once he began to file insufficient returns, he was notified about his tax liability by
the IRS. 9 ' Also in the record was tax protest literature that Foster had sent to the
IRS. 191
Again applying the objective test, the Foster court stated that "[w]hatever may
be the theoretical objections, the Seventh Circuit has adopted an objective test:
because the mistake of law defense is extremely limited, a mistake on the defend-
ant's part must be 'objectively reasonable.' "192
In United States v. Davenport,193 the Seventh Circuit again declined to abandon
the objective test. The defendant, Amos Davenport, was a tax protester charged
'94with multiple counts of tax evasion and failure to file tax returns.
180. Id. The court rejected the defendant's reliance on United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1985).
See also supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
181. Bressler, 772 F.2d at 290. The court again refused to address the subjective versus objective standard be-
cause it was not "plain error" under Rule 52(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id.
182. 789 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1986).




187. Id. at 459.
188. Id. at 461.
189. Id. at 461-62.
190. Id. at 462.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 461 (citing United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082
(1986); United States v. Witvoet, 767 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
193. 824 F.2d 1511 (7th Cir. 1987).
194. Id. at 1512.
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For twenty years, defendant worked full time for the same steel company. 195 For
the taxable years of 1980 through 1984, his annual gross income ranged from
$28,000 to $33,300.196 For the years prior to 1980, the defendant filed his returns,
but for the years of 1980 through 1984 he did not.197
In March of 1978, when the defendant filed his tax return for the 1977 taxable
year, he showed signs of becoming a tax protester.198 When filing his return he
enclosed a letter to the IRS that explained that he would compute his taxes by ap-
plying the rate of .005 % to his income.199 Based on the application of this rate, the
defendant requested a refund of $3,840.62 from the taxes that had been withheld
by his employer.200 In 1980, the defendant filed a new W-4 Form claiming to be
"exempt" from withholding." 1 As a result, his employer withheld no federal taxes
for that year. 202
In 1985 the U.S. Attorney hand-delivered a letter to him which stated that the
grand jury was suspicious of his tax paying behavior and encouraged him to file
his returns.20 ' The defendant replied that he was researching and studying income
tax; the grand jury, however, indicted Mr. Davenport anyway.
204
At trial, the defendant called one witness, a businessman and part-time law-
yer.20 ' The witness testified that in 1980 he and the defendant attended several
meetings sponsored by the group Citizens For Just Taxation.20 6 He also testified
that he had advised the defendant that the tax laws applied only to government
workers or a corporation's officers. 207 The witness further stated that he told Dav-
enport that federal reserve notes were "bogus. '"208 Upon cross examination, the
witness also testified that he informed the defendant about cases which held that






199. Id. The letter to the IRS stated:
Nowhere in the instruction booklet could I find a computation table that ideally conforms to my particular
demands. Ex-President Richard M. Nixon and cohorts ha[ve] had access to such a table apparently, in
that he based his taxes on less than one half of one percent .005 percent. This is the formula I am basing
my taxes on since the Constitution of the United States of America requires that taxes be levied equal to
all.
Id.
200. Davenport, 824 F.2d at 1512.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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Davenport complained that the district judge erred when he instructed the jury
on the meaning of a good faith mistake of law defense.21 Specifically, the defend-
ant challenged the validity of the court's application of the "objectively reasonable"
test as applied in Moore. 211 The court again declined to abandon the objective test
and affirmed the defendant's conviction.212 The court stated that" '[t]he reason-
ableness requirement is intended to give the jury a method by which they can dis-
tinguish between a bona fide misunderstanding of the law and obdurate refusal to
acknowledge (present in so many tax protester cases) what the law indeed does re-
quire.' ,213
United States v. Buckner214 is the latest of this long line of tax protester cases. In
Buckner, the defendant was charged with tax evasion and failure to file tax returns
as in all the preceding tax protester cases mentioned in this note.215 The prosecutor
sought, and the district court granted, an order forbidding the defense to notify the
jury of any matters relating to five specific issues. 216 This list of defenses has be-
come a checklist of defenses often used by tax protesters. It includes:
That the Sixteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution was improperly ratified
and therefore never came into being; That wages are not income and therefore are
not subject to federal income tax laws; That tax laws are unconstitutional; That fil-
ing a tax return violates the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution; That Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute
cash or income.217
Buckner argued that he must not be convicted if his conduct resulted from a
mistaken belief that his actions were lawful.218 The court held that "[t]he approach
is brought up short by this circuit's rule that only objectively reasonable mistakes
negate the necessary mental state for tax offenses."219 In justifying this decision,
the court stated that "[i]f the legal system accepts every mistake of law as a de-
fense, this leads people to be ignorant, to delude themselves, or to tell tall tales to
the jury."2 ' The court stated that because it had repeatedly rejected these five
propositions that the district court had banned, Mr. Buckner's "mistakes" were not
objectively reasonable.22' Also, because Buckner had filed tax returns until 1981
but then stopped filing returns and began making spurious claims of exemptions
210. Id. at 1517.
211. Id. at 1518.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1518 (quoting United States v. Bressler, 772 E2d 287, 291 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1082 (1986)).
214. 830 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1987).
215. Id. at 102.
216. Id. at 103.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 103 (citing United States v. Moore, 627 F.2d'at 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916
(1981)).
220. Id. at 103.
221. Id. at 104.
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on his W-4 Forms, the evidence was sufficient to reject any valid mistake of law
defense. 222
IV. INSTANT CASE
In Cheek v. United States,223 the Supreme Court, in a six to two decision with
Justice Scalia writing a separate concurring opinion and Justices Blackmun and
Marshall dissenting, held that a good faith belief that one's actions do not violate
the law negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding
is objectively reasonable. 24 The primary issue in this case was whether the Sev-
enth Circuit was correct in applying an "objectively reasonable" standard in tax
protester cases where the defendant claimed a mistake of law defense.225
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that "[t]he general rule that igno-
rance of the law or [that] a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is
deeply rooted in the American legal system." 226 This was based on the idea that
"the law is definite and knowable .. ".."227 However, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that "[tihe proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties
and obligations imposed by the tax laws. "228 Thus, the Court recognized an excep-
tion to the traditional "ignorance of the law is no defense" rule by stating: "It]his
special treatment of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax
laws."229
Justice White wrote that the government need only prove "that the law imposed
a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntar-
ily and intentionally violated that duty."23' He also added that "this burden requires
negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a
misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating
any of the provisions of the tax laws."231 Justice White reasoned that this is "be-
cause one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon him and yet be igno-
rant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does not exist. 232 The
Court held that:
We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith
belief must be objeciively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating the
Government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty
at issue ....
222. Id.
223. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
224. Id. at 610.
225. Id. at 609.
226. Id. at 609 (citations omitted).
227. Id. at 609.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 610.
231. Id. at 610-11.
232. Id. at 611.
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It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's under-
standing that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file
a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible
as such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be.233
Justice Scalia, writing in concurrence, stated "I concur in the judgment. . . be-
cause our cases have consistently held that the failure to pay a tax in the good-faith
belief that it is not legally owing is not 'willful.' "234
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall, wrote
that "[t]his court's opinion .. .will encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous
views of the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity." 235 In response
to the majority's concern that innocent taxpayers would be convicted of willful tax
evasion because of the complexity of the tax code, Justice Blackmun concluded
that "we are concerned in this case . . . with the income tax law in its most ele-
mentary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages income?"236
Justice Blackmun added:
It is incomprehensible to me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution
of our present federal income tax system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913
...any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of stat-
utory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not in-
come, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the gullible to resist
income tax collections.237
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Mistake of Law Defense and Its Special Application
in Tax Evasion Cases
One of the most well-known legal slogans is ignorantiajuris quod quisque tene-
tur scire, meninem excusat238 or "ignorance of the law is no excuse. "23 However,
each of these tax evasion defendants relied on the mistake of law defense in at-
233. Id.
234. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 613 (Scalia, J., concurring).
235. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, in which Marshall, J., joined).
236. Id. at 614.
237. Id. at 615.
238. The English translation of this Latin phrase is "ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
excuses no man."
239. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 643. "The doctrine that a mistake of/aw is no excuse appears to be
a survival of the early Norman or pre-Norman absolute liability, irrespective of any mistake, whether of fact or of
law." Id. However, Roman law allowed the mistake of law defense for "'persons under twenty-five years,
women, soldiers, and peasants and other persons of small intelligence,' or '[persons] who had no opportunity to
consult counsel.' "Id. at 643.
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tempting to escape guilt. 240 It is true that a mistake of law, where the defendant
does not know that his conduct is illegal, does not operate as a defense in most
criminal cases. However, this must be compared to those specific crimes in which
a specific criminal intent to act in a manner known to be illegal is required.241 In
these crimes, a mistake of law may provide a defense.242 Because 26 U.S.C. §§
7201 and 7203 require that a defendant willfully attempt to defeat or evade taxes,
these crimes have been labeled specific intent crimes, thereby allowing mistake of
law to serve as a defense. 2' The term "willfulness" has been defined in various
contexts, but, in tax evasion cases, the Court provided the most stringent defini-
tion. In Spies v. United States, the Court defined the term "willfulness" as "a viola-
tion of a known legal duty. '245 Because willfulness is a state of mind, it can only be
proved by the defendant's testimony or by circumstantial evidence. 246 Here is
240. The mistake of law defense allows ignorance of the law to serve as a defense. This is contrary to the maxim
that everyone was presumed to know the law. See 2 SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HisToRy OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND (Reprinted 1973) (1 st ed. 1883), 114 ("Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it.").
The mistake of law defense must be distinguished from the mistake of fact defense. For example, a mistake of
fact might easily result in an accidental killing, and if the mistake were reasonable, no subjective moral guilt or
even objective negligence could be imputed to the defendant. Hall & Seligman, supra, note 13, at 643-44.
241. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Supreme Court struck down a felony registration stat-
ute that required felons to register with local authorities upon entering a city. Id. at 227. The Court invalidated the
statute because it did not require proof that the defendant knew she was required to register, and there was no
evidence making it probable that she knew of her obligation. Id. However, the court reiterated that ignorance of
the law is generally not an excuse. Id. at 228.
242. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 641. "In these [specific intent] crimes, the court or legislature, by
thus defining the crime, has said that any condition negativing the existence of the required state of mind should
result in an acquittal." Id. at 641.
243. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. The word willfidly was purposely removed from the Model,
Penal Code. Judge Learned Hand stated that it was an "awful word and one of the most troublesome words in a
statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, 'willful' would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end
of the alphabet." Yochum, supra note 60, at 222; see also Michael E. Tigar, "Willfulness"and "Ignorance"In Fed-
eral Criminal Law, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 525,527-30 (1989). A draft of the revised pattern jury instructions for
the Fifth Circuit attempts to clarify the word "willful":
The word "willfully" is frequently included in the indictment, even when not required by statute or case
law. This practice should be discouraged. The 1978 Fifth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions in-
serted "willfully" as an element of almost every crime and then supplied this definition of that term: "The
word 'willfully,' as that term has been used from time to time in these instructions, means that the act was
committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that ii to
say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law."
Id. at 527.
But see United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that "willfulness" is a"violation of a
known legal duty").
244. The term "willfulness" has also been subject to some controversy in civil rights cases under 18 U.S.C.
section 242. In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) it was interpreted as meaning "specific intent." See
Tigar supra note 242, at 536 ("a more sensible reading of Screws gives weight to the plurality's conclusion that the
specific intent requirement in civil rights cases ensures that the accused 'is aware that what he does is precisely
that which the statute forbids.' ") Id.
245. 317 U.S. 492, 501 (1943).
246. See Joshua Stein, Criminal Liabiliry for Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax, 81 COL. L. REv. 1348, 1355
(1981) [hereinafter Stein] (noting that in some cases, the jury need not make such subtle inferences). For exam-
ple, in United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1978), the taxpayer, after being read his Miranda rights,
stated in explaining his failure to report certain receipts: "Okay, I was trying to screw the government out of some
cash ifI could." Stein, supra, at 1355. See also United States v. Skalicky, 615 F.2d 1100, 1117 (5th Cir. 1980)
(taxpayer told IRS agent that everyone lies at times); United States v. Callahan, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9190 (5th
Cit. 1979) (taxpayer used coded entries in records to indicate unreported income)..
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where the problem of whether to apply the subjective or objective test manifests
itself.
The cause of many of the differences in application of the mistake of law de-
fense, as exhibited by the Seventh Circuit's "reasonableness requirement", re-
volves around two distinct situations:
(1). that in which the defendant lacks the mental state required for commission of the
crime, and thus has a valid defense; and
(2). that in which the defendant still had the requisite mental state for commission of
the crime, and only claims that he was unaware that such conduct was proscribed by
law. 247
Commentators 21 and courts249 have argued that such a defense would undoubtedly
shield the guilty because the defendant's claim of ignorance could not be refuted.
The Seventh Circuit's requirement that a mistake of law defense must also be
objectively reasonable has been endorsed by other legal scholars who would place
the burden of proving such mistake upon the defendant.250 Justice Holmes argued
that:
[I] f the defense is to be based upon an excuse personal to the defendant, there must be
clear, objective evidence that the defendant did not know his conduct was forbidden
by the law, and his excuse for this lack of knowledge must be one which objectively
negatives any possible fault on his part.251
In Cheek, the Court recognized an exception to the traditional rule that igno-
rance of the law is no defense by holding that criminal tax offenses would be
granted "special treatment" due to the complexity of the tax laws. 252 Should this be
a blanket exception even when complex Internal Revenue provisions are not at is-
sue? In Cheek, the only issue was whether or not Cheek had to file'tax returns.
247. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.4-3.11 (2d ed. 1986).
248. Austin felt that:
[1] f ignorance of the law were admitted as a ground of exemption, the Courts would be involved in ques-
tions which were scarcely possible to solve, and which would render the administration of justice next to
impracticable. Were a mistake of law negativing culpability to be admitted as a defense, the courts would
have to determine, first, whether the party was actually ignorant of the law, and second, whether his ig-
norance was inevitable or was due to his fault.
Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 646-47.
249. See United States v. Echols, 677 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1982) (taxpayer's argument that two thousand pages of
regulations are too vague to be understood by the ordinary citizen was rejected. The court stated that -courts
cannot decide as a matter of law that ignorance of an obligation to pay some tax on wages is a defense whereas the
common sense of the matter is that every citizen actually knows the tax falls on nearly every worker.")
250. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 647. Justice Holmes believed that "this problem of difficulty of
proof could be solved 'by throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the law-breaker.' "Id. He argued that:
[1]f the law were to give any general defense of ignorance of law, it ought to place on the defendant the
burden of showing (1) that he did not know that his act was criminal under the law; (2) that if it was mor-
ally wrong according to the mores, he did not know that either; and (3) that both beliefs were reasonable
on his part.
Id.
251. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 648 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 48
(1881)).
252. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 609.
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This requirement is surely not of such technical nature that the Court need apply
this exception to the mistake of law defense.253 Furthermore, will all complex laws
be subject to this exception in the future?
B. The Tax Evasion Cases: Who Are The Players?
Because Cheek resolved a conflict between the Seventh Circuit and the other
circuits, it is important to examine the character of the defendants involved in these
tax evasion cases. In the Seventh Circuit cases, where the court applied the more
stringent objective standard, a very specific type of defendant was involved. This
defendant generally possessed the following personal attributes:
(1) an above-average education;
(2) an above-average salary;
(3) a past history of tax compliance;
(4) an indoctrination with a cult-like group who preached the "virtues" of non-com-
pliance with the tax laws;
(5) a subsequent halt in the compliance with the tax laws;
(6) upon indictment and trial, the use of the "standard" list of tax protester defenses;
253. Because the fate of these tax evasion cases turns on the exactness of the instructions to the jury, it is impor-
tant to allow reasonableness to be used in the jury's determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence without
demanding a strict objectively reasonable standard. For example, In United States v. Dube', 820 F.2d 886 (7th
Cir. 1987), the trial judge instructed the jury "to use reasonableness merely as one factor in determining subjec-
tive good faith." Id. at 891.
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254(7) participation in past tax protester cases.
After reviewing the character of the defendants in these tax evasion cases, it is
not difficult to understand why the Seventh Circuit opted for the more stringent
objective test. Likewise, it is easy to understand why the other circuits felt inclined
to apply the less stringent subjective standard when one examines the character of
the defendants involved in their cases.
Unlike the Seventh Circuit cases, these cases did not involve the typical tax pro-
tester. These defendants displayed similar educational backgrounds and similar
salary ranges as those Seventh Circuit defendants; however, they showed no signs
of being tax protesters."'
Jerde is representative of the type of defendant involved in these cases tried out-
side of the Seventh Circuit. Does this suggest that the remaining circuits have yet
to encounter defendants who exhibit deliberate refusals to file that were mentioned
by the Aitken court?256
254. For example, in Moore, the defendant, a businessman, can be assumed to have an adequate educational
background. He had an average income in excess of $30,000 for the years he failed to file. Moore had also filed
valid tax returns for at least five years prior to the years he began not to file. Although the court made no mention
of any cult indoctrination, Moore began writing Fifth Amendment objections across the face of his "tax return"
and attached tax protester materials thereon. This began the defendant's years of tax noncompliance, which in-
cluded the years of 1972, 1973 and 1974. At trial, Moore used some of the more commonly used tax protester
defenses. These included that Federal Reserve notes were worthless, and therefore Moore did not have any real
income. This defense was used even though Moore used Federal Reserve notes to purchase an expensive house
and a Mercedes Benz during the 1972-1974 period. Moore, 627 F.2d at 831-33.
In Witvoet, the defendant had a history of tax compliance until he became acquainted with tax protest move-
ment members. Witvoet was impressed by what he heard from this tax protester cult and decided to stop paying
his taxes. At trial, the defendant gave several classic tax protester defenses, such as his dislike of paying taxes, the
belief that paying taxes was illegal, (even though he had paid taxes in the past and suffered no legal ramifications),
and that payment of taxes was a totally voluntary act. He also testified at trial that the only reason he decided to
file subsequent returns for 1979-1982 was that he felt it would make a good impression on the jury in the event he
was tried. Witvoet, 767 F.2d at 339-40.
In Bressler, the defendant was affiliated with two insurance agencies and received income of over $250,000;
however, he never filed any tax returns for these years. Bressler was also affiliated with a tax protester group who
advocated several methods to evade income taxes. He also employed the usual tax protester defenses at his trial.
Bressler, 772 F.2d at 289-90.
In Foster, the defendant had been employed as a police officer and was also collecting some pension benefits.
Prior to 1979, Foster filed yearly tax returns; however, far the period of 1979-1982, he failed to file. The court
made no mention of any cult indoctrination; however, at trial, Foster relied on the usual tax protester defenses,
including that the prosecution was void ab initio because the Sixteenth Amendment was never properly ratified.
Foster, 789 F.2d at 458-59.
In Davenport, the defendant was employed at a steel mill. For the years in question his income averaged
nearly $30,000. Prior to 1978, the defendant filed valid tax returns and paid the resulting tax. It was not until cult
indoctrination by Citizens For Just Taxation in 1978 that Davenport failed to file his returns. He also used a wide
array of usual tax protester defenses. Davenport, 824 F2d at 1512-13.
Finally, in Buckner, the defendant attempted to use the list of "tired arguments" so frequently used in the tax
protester cases. It was only because the court disallowed these arguments that they were not ultimately used.
Buckner, 830 F.2d at 103-05.
255. For example, in Jerde, 841 F.2d at 818, the defendant was charged with tax evasion and argued that he did
not know he had to file because he was waiting on the outcome of state court litigation that would determine the
form of his current business and any resulting tax. There was no evidence of any cult indoctrination, nor evi-
dence of a clear history of tax non- compliance. Id.
256. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1985).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
C. The Cheek Decision: Its Effects on Tax Compliance
In dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]his Court's opinion today, I fear, will
encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in the hope of convincing
a jury of their sincerity. If that ensues, I suspect we have gone beyond the limits of
common sense."" 7 In an era of increasing tax non-compliance and an ever-in-
creasing budget deficit, the Supreme Court, with its decision in Cheek, has fueled
both the "big time" tax evader and the everyday individual who is willing to risk
getting caught.258 Tax protesters not only face good odds of never being caught, 5 9
but if caught and prosecuted, are given the opportunity to convince ajury that they
sincerely believed these frivolous excuses .26 No matter how ridiculous the de-
fense, the jury need only believe that the defendant honestly believed what he was
doing was legal. 261 The Supreme Court has lessened the seriousness of the crime
of tax evasion in an era when greater compliance is needed.
The American people already see tax evasion as an unimportant crime. "An
IRS poll conducted in March 1980 found that 71 % of respondents ranked stealing
$500 from an employer as a very serious crime but only 51 % ranked evading $500
in income tax as a very serious crime."262 The nature of the income tax system or-
ders taxpayers not to cheat yet provides the taxpayer with ample opportunity to do
so.263 The Cheek decision has weakened a system that is already quite vulnerable
due to its voluntary nature .164 Now, potential tax evaders have more arrows in a
quiver that was already overflowing. Justice Holmes suggested that admitting the
mistake of law excuse "would be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has
determined to make men know and obey."
265
257. Cheek, III S. Ct. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, in which Marshall, J., joined).
258. Justice Holmes argued that "[i]f ignorance of the law were a defense, it would be difficult for the state to
bring home to its citizens knowledge of new regulations affecting their rights and duties, or of new crimes, and
thus to establish the new rules in social mores of the community." Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 648.
259. See Chester N. Mitchell, Willingness-to-Pay: Taxation and Tax Compliance, 15 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 127
(1985). IRS auditing rates increase with income level. Id. at 133 n.29. Under $10,000 income, the chance of an
audit is .35%. Id. At $10,000-$25,000 the chance increases to 2.45% and over $50,000 to a 5.68% chance. Id.
260. Justice Holmes also saw that the mistake of law defense could possibly affect the community. He would
not have allowed the mistake of law defense if it would have "relax[ed] the influence of the law generally on the
community." Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 650.
261. See Yochum, supra note 60:
[Tihe development of the law from Spies onward (which Congress has done nothing to stunt) has been
toward an interpretation which encourages ignorance and charlatanry .... In the United States, individ-
uals know they have income tax obligations; if confusion exists, competent advice should be sought. If
they fail to seek that advice because of stupidity or a sub rosa belief that they will learn they have to pay,
full criminal sanctions should be able to be brought against them.
Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
262. See Mitchell, supra note 57, at 132 n.23.
263. Id.
264. See Yochum, supra note 60, at 223 ("If voluntary compliance . is so critical to the collection of the
revenue, ignorance of the laws requiring the payment of taxes should not be a defense to prosecution for crimes
against the [tax] code.")
265. See Hall & Seligman, supra note 13, at 648. Justice Holmes also argued that "justice to the individual is
rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the scales." Id.
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Furthermore, since tax evasion is safer than people realize, undetected eva-
sion, or one individual who has escaped tax evasion by using the standard laundry
list of tax protester defenses, will inspire non-compliance efforts by others.
Growth in the perception that others are successfully evading the income tax is
commonly identified as a reason for increased non-compliance. 6 6 The low proba-
bility of detection, arrest and conviction for income tax evasion can be counter-
acted by higher spending on direct enforcement or the imposition of more severe
penalties .267 Furthermore, stiffer criminal penalties would force citizens to seek
competent tax assistance from accountants and attorneys. 268 The Supreme Court's
decision in Cheek undercuts each of these possibilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of tax evasion cases is certain to increase with the Court's decision
in Cheek. Tax evaders who were "on the line" between paying or not paying their
taxes will certainly be pushed towards those who choose not to pay.269 Cheek will
inevitably invite tax evaders into our nation's already cluttered courts with only
one thing in mind-to convince the jury with a straight face of preposterous ex-
cuses for not paying one's taxes.27 These tax evaders are not sincere in their be-
liefs but take the opportunity, so allowed by Cheek, to take advantage of a system
so dependant on voluntary compliance.
266. See Yochum supra note 60, at 226.
Before World War II, the incidence of the tax on the populace and the rate of taxation was not as wide-
spread or severe as today. In the Jazz Age there was a sense that, in the bustle of more significant enter-
prise, an otherwise honest citizen or, perhaps, even a jurist, could just forget to pay his tax. Here, in the
late twentieth century, it is impossible to believe that anyone with income of any significance does not
know the government will take some share, and even aliens must know April 15 is our day of reckoning.
Id.
267. See Yochum, supra note 60, at 223. (The existence of the mistake of law defense "is an anomaly in an
overall enforcement system designed to encourage taxpayers to know and follow the law.") Id.
268. See Yochum, supra note 60, at 232 ("[A] rational system of criminal penalties to encourage voluntary
compliance should motivate the citizen to seek competent tax counsel.")
269. Id. at 234. ("Too often in this area, taxpayers are given the opportunity to play games, evaluating the risk
of getting caught, the value of the penalty, the confusion of the law, and the profit in non-compliance. Burdened,
the Service fears [that civil penalties] no longer frighten the citizenry into voluntary compliance.") Id.
270. See Yochum, supra note 60, at 232.
The magnitude of the problem created by this logical anomaly is difficult to gauge. Trial courts are lit-
tered and trial judges, irritated. Prosecutions are successful but time is drawn away from what must be
more meritorious pursuits. Tax protest movements seem to blaze dementedly, then are beaten to a few
radical embers, only to flame with some new spark of insanity elsewhere.
Id. at 232.

